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original results, to become established. It could even drive the most
creative young scientists into other fields. It is therefore submitted
that while Washington. Research may have been correctly decided as a
matter of statutory interpretation, the result of the decision is errone-
ous in view of the policies behind the exemption."" It is recom-
mended that Congress amend the Freedom of Information Act to
correct the source of the error.
One possible amendment would simply add another exemption
for
confidential, technical or scientific data or research designs
or other information submitted in or with an application
for a research grant or in or with a report while research is
in progress.
This suggested amendment is narrow, and thus may leave unconsid-
ered interests which need 10 be protected. However, given the policy
of the FOIA in favor of disclosure, it is better that exemptions be nar-
rowly designed to protect areas where protection is clearly necessary,
as it is here. At the same time, this amendment would protect the pri-
vate interest of the scientist and would in the long run protect the
public interest in a healthy and vigorous scientific community.
MARION KATZ L 1 TT M A N
Tax–Treatment of Alleged Violations of Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act–Cummings v. Commissioner'—In designing section 16(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Act), 2
 Congress clearly in-
tended to curb the abuses of "insider" trading by divesting insiders of
"3 See text at notes 84.100, sulwa, particularly with reference to the policy of pro-
tecting one required to submit inlO•mation to a government agency front the "substan-
tial harm" to his competitive position which could be the result of public disclosure of
that information.
' 506 F,2d 449 (2d Cir. 1974), rrv'g 60 T.C. 91 (1973).
2
 Section 16()), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970) provides in pertinent part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of inlitrination which nay
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason
of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any
purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of an equity security of such
issuer .. , within any period of less than six months ... shall inure to and
be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of
such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction
of holding the security purchased or of nut repurchasing the security sold
for a period exceeding six months.
3 "A person who has special access to information concerning a corporatitin, be-
cause of financial interest or a role in management is referred to as an 'insider.' Such
persons are subject to special restrictions in using such data in trading in securities." D.
VAG-rs, BANG ComittATuis:LAw 784 (1973). For purposes of § 16(b). an insider is any
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the profits obtained from certain types of transactions.4 Thus, where
an insider realizes a profit from a purchase and sale or sale and re-
purchase of stock within a six month period he is required by the Act
to repay his profits to the corporation. 5 However, where an insider at-
tempts to deduct this section 16(b) repayment as a business expense, 6
the policies of the tax system interact and may conflict with the se-
curity law provisions requiring repayment of insider profits. The ques-
tion of whether a section 16(b) repayment should be deductible,
therefore, must be viewed from the perspective of both the goals of
the tax system and the intent of section 16(b). From a tax standpoint,
the well-established principle that Congress intended only to tax net
income' has resulted in a general willingness to allow legitimate busi-
ness expense deductions. 8 On the other hand, the primary concern of
the security laws is whether the impact of the section 16(b) repayment
would be diminshed by permitting a business deduction of the fine. 9
An additional problem arising from the interplay of section 16(b) and
the tax laws stems from the judicially developed tax policy that where
a loss, such as that suffered in repayment of a section 16(b) fine, is in-
tegrally related to an earlier capital gains transaction, the loss must be
characterized in "thesame manner as the gain," i.e., as a capital loss."
This characterization of a section 16(b) violation in terms of a capital
officer or director, or a shareholder who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of
more than 10 percent of any equity security which is registered under § 12, 15 U.S.C.
781 (1970) of the Act.. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
The statutory language is cited in note 2 supra. For pertinent legislative history,
see generally H.R. Rri ,. No. 1'383, 73d CONG., 2d Si(ss. (1934); SEN, REP. Nos. 792, 1455,
73d CONG., 2d St(ss, (1934); Nelson, Tax Deductibility of Insider Profit Repayments: Resolving
An Apparent Conflict, 24 CASE W. Res. L. Rev. 330, 341-42 (1973).
5 See note 2 supra.
A business expense deduction would he available under § 162(a) of the Code,
which provides in pertinent part: "There shall he allowed as a deduction all the ordi-
nary and necessary expenses paid or incurred' during the taxable year in carrying on
any trade or business." INT. Rev. Cone. or 1954, § 162(a). The 162(a) test, set forth in
Nathan Cummings, 60 T.C,, 91, 93, 95-96 (1973), stipulates: (1) that the taxpayer must
be in the business of trade of being a corporate executive or officer; and (2) that the
payment made pursuant to section 16(h) must be undertaken to preserve his business
reputation. This lest has been the principal rationale used by the Tax Court in justify-
ing such deductions. See, e.g., Charles I: Brown, 32 CCH Tax Ct., Mem, 1300, 1301.02
(1973); Nathan Cummings, 60 T.C. 91, 93-96 (1973); James E. Anderson, 56 T.C.
1370, 1373.74 (1970); William L. Mitchell, 52 T.C. 170, 175-76 (1969); Laurence M,
Marks, 27 T.C. 464, 467 (1956).
'Commissioner v, Tether, 383 U.S. 687, 691-92 (1966); Commissioner v. Sulli-
van, 356 U.S. 27, 29 (1958).
" Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691-92 (1966); Commissioner v. Sulli-
van, 356 U.S. 27, 29 (1958).
The deduction would reduce gross income, and therefore the taxes which
would otherwise have to be paid.
1 " United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1969); Arrowsmith v.
Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6, 8-9 (1952); Cummings, 506 F.2d at 451.
" The tax treatment of capital losses under § 1211 (h)(1) of the Internal Revenue
Code is as follows:
(b) Other taxpayers. (I) In general. In the case of a taxpayer other than a
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gain-capital loss transaction has provoked considerable judicial
conflict."
The most recent circuit court pronouncement in this area is
Cummings v. Commissioner. 13
 Plaintiff Cummings, a director of Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., (MGM) sold 3,400 MGM shares and paid capi-
tal gains tax on the profit from this sale. However, within a six month
period, he repurchased 3,000 shares. Pursuant to section 16(b) of the
Act, Cummings was then notified that he was required to pay any
"profits"" resulting from his sale-purchase transactions to MGM.
Failure to pay would cause his indebtedness to be noted in the forth-
coming MGM proxy statement's and a suit to be brought against him
by MGM." Cummings, maintaining his innocence," nevertheless re-
mitted his "profits" to MGM claiming that the remission was made to
prevent delay in the issuance of the proxy statement and to protect
his business reputation, which wauld be damaged by either notation
of his indebtedness in the proxy statement or his involvement in a sec-
tion 16(b) liability suit." Cummings subsequently deducted from his
gross income an amount equal to his repayment to MGM, as an ordi-
nary and necessary business expense under section 162 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code,"
The Internal Revenue Commissioner denied the business expense
deduction, instead limiting the deduction to capital loss treatment
under section 1211(b). 20
 Thereafter, Cummings instituted suit in the
corporation, losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets shall be al-
lowed only to the extent of the gains from such sales or exchanges, plus (if
such losses exceed such gains) whichever of the following is smallest: (A)
the taxable income for the taxable year, (B) $1,000, or (C) the sum of—(i)
the excess of the net short-term capital loss over the net long-term capital
gain, and (ii) one-half of the excess of the net long-term capital loss over
the net short-term capital gain.
I NT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1211(b)(1).
12
 Cummings v. Commissioner, 506 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'g 60 T.C. 91
(1973); Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'g 56 T.C, 1370
(1971); Mitchell v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970), rev'g 52 T.C. 170
(1969), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909 (1971); Charles I. Brown, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1300
(1973), appeal docketed 10th Cir.
12 506 F.2d•449 (2d Cir. 1974).
" Insider "profits" are calculated for purposes of § 16(b) as the difference be-
tween the purchase and sale price according to the principle of "lowest-in/highest-out."
This calculation requires a matching of the lowest purchase against the highest sale, the
next lowest purchase against the next highest sale, etc. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136
F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943); Painter, The Evolving Role
of Section 16(b), 62 Micti. L. REV. 649, 652 (1964).
" Notation in the proxy statement of any indebtedness is required by Schedule
14A, Item 7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, item 7(e), Instruction 4 (1974).
" 506 F.2d at 450. In accordance with the Act, such suit could be commenced by
the corporation if repayment was not made. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
" Cummings claimed that if any violation of § 16(b) had occurred, it had been
inadvertent. 506 F.2d at 450.
18 Id. at 450.
See note 6 supra for the provisions of § 162(a) of the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954.
20 See note 11 supra for provisions of § 1211(b) of the Isar. REV. CODE or 1954.
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Tax Court." After exploration of the facts, the Tax Court, conclud-
ing that plaintiff's role as a director constituted a business and that
the expenses were incurred to protect plaintiffs business reputation,
permitted a business expense deduction22 under section 162. 23 The
distinction between these two types of deductions is important because
a business loss can be used to offset ordinary income" while a
capital" loss permits a less generous allowance.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the Tax
Court's decision," and in agreement, with the Commissioner HELD:
payment of the apparent liability under section 16(h) should be
treated as a long term capital loss and not as a business expense de-
ductible from ordinary income. 27 The court noted that Cummings
had been given favorable capital gains treatment when his stock was
sold." Therefore, allowance of an ordinary deduction for his section
16(b) repayment, presumably paid from profits of the earlier sale,
would improperly permit him favorable tax treatment twice" in viola-
tion of settled principles established by the Supreme Court. 30 In addi-
tion, the court supported its decision by pointing out that the tax ad-
vantage Cummings would receive if an ordinary deduction were
granted would frustrate the purpose of section 16(b). 31
This note will discuss the fundamental policy concerns which
underlie the judicial treatment of the section 16(b) tax deduction
21 Nathan  Cummings, 60 T,C. 91 (1973).
22 Id. at 93-96.
" See note 6 supra for provisions of § 162(a) of the INT. REV. CODE or 1954.
24 INT. REV. CODE OF . 1954 § 62(1).
" See note 11 supra. See also Nelson, supra note 4, at 340.
28 506 F.2d at 449. A Tax Court decision is appealable to the appropriate circuit
court. if the circuit which will hear the case; has already ruled on the issue, the Tax
Court feels bound to accept that circuit's rationale even if the Tax Court itself would
disagree with the reasoning. When the relevant circuit has not spoken, however, the
Tax Court feels free to disregard rulings made by other circuits. See Jack E. Golsen, 54
T.C. 742, 756-57 (1970).
" 506 F.2d at 449.
28
 1d. at 451.
"Id. at 451-52.
" United States v, Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 685 (1969); Arrowsmith v.
Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6, 7-9 (1952).
31 506 F.2d at 452. For example, if in a Cummings type sale-repurchase set of
transactions, the insider
sold stock for $20 and within six months thereafter purchased an equal
number of shares of the stock for $10; he would pay no tax at the time of
purchase. Assuming that he is in a 50-percent tax bracket (an ordinary
loss l deduction in the amount of the repayment, $10 would save him $5,
so that the net repayment to the corporation would amount to merely $5
instead of the full profit of $10 required by section 16(b).
Nelson, Tax Deductibility of Insider Profit Repayments: Resolving an Apparent Conflict, 24
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 330, 346 n.62 (1973). Assuming that Congress designed the §
16(b) penalty to exact a Fine precisely calculated to deter insiders from engaging in cer-
tain short-term trading, the deduction of thiS fine as an ordinary loss would reduce the
impact of the loss Suffered from the repaynient which, in turn, would ditriinish the de-
terrent effect of the fine.
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issue. Toward that end, primary attention will be focused upon isolat-
ing the various considerations which have influenced the circuit and
tax courts in their decisions regarding this issue. 32 Examination of
these considerations, it is submitted, will indicate that although the
courts have available the necessary rationales to adequately resolve the
repayment-deduction issue, the structuring of these rationales into a
logical and coherent standard has not yet occurred. In conclusion, this
note will summarize several proposals to modify the present tax
treatment of section 16(b) repayments and discuss the feasibility of
each alternative.
Since a discernable pattern 33 in the opposing Tax Court-circuit
court treatment of the deductibility of section 16(b) repayments has
emerged, an in-depth examination of the different treatment ac-
corded taxpayer Cummings by the Second Circuit and the Tax Court
should provide an adequate basis for determining the merit of the
current judicial approaches to the deductibility problem. In deciding
Cummings, the three judge circuit court panel relied heavily upon two
Supreme Court decisions — Arrowsmith v. Commissioner" and United
States v. Skelly Oil Co. 35 Because of the emphasis placed upon these de-
cisions, a brief review of the facts of each case is essential. Arrowsmith
involved a situation where, upon liquidation of a corporation, the two
sole shareholders received distributions which were taxed at capital
gains rates. In a subsequent year, these former shareholders became
liable for and paid a judgment rendered against the now dissolved
corporation. 38
 Although the taxpayers attempted to write off this
payment as an ordinary business expense, the Supreme Court disal-
lowed the deduction,37 emphasizing that since their loss was related to
the prior distributions which had received favorable capital gains
treatment, allowance of an ordinary deduction would provide these
taxpayers with a windfal1. 38 In addition, the Court rejected the ordi-
'12
 Three principles have had a dominant role in determining deductibility: (1)
the principle that a loss should be characterized in the same terms as an earlier related
gain if allowing the deduction of the loss would bestow favorable tax treatment on the
same amount twice, see text at notes 34-76 infra; (2) public policy concerns, including
the frustration doctrine and the policy against supplementing statutory fines through
the tax system, see text at notes 75-108 infra; and (3) the business expense argument
premised on § 162(a) of the Code, see note 6 supra.
as
	 1956, the tax court has continually allowed the taxpayer a § 162(a) de-
duction for the repayment of his insider fine. E.g., Charles I. Brown, 332 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1300 (1973). On appeal, however, every circuit to consider the question has re-
versed, limiting the deduction to capital loss treatment. See Cummings v. Commissioner,
506 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'g 60 T.C. 91 (1973); Anderson v. Commissioner, 480
F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'g 56 T.C. 1370 (1971); Mitchell v. Commissioner, 428
F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970), rev'g 52 T.C. 170 (1969), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909 (1971).
't 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
as 394 U.S. 678 (1969).
' 6 344 U.S. at 7.
	 .	 .
"7
 Id. at 9.
" Id. at 7-9. The windfall results from the fact that the amount was originally
taxed at a lower capital gains rate, but would be deducted from income to be taxed at a
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nary business deduction argument on the ground that the loss was not
the result of any separate business venture, but was incurred because
of the taxpayers' status 'as shareholders — the same status which had
earlier netted the taxpayers a gain." To prevent the taxpayers from
becoming unjustly enriched, the Court characterized the second
transaction in the same terms as the earlier transaction. 4 ° Such a
characterization resulted in the loss being deducted as a capital loss
because the initial asset distribution was subject to capital gain
treatment.'"
The Arrowsmith principle was subsequently applied in Skelly Oil. In
1957, the taxpayer corporation, Skelly Oil, set prices in accordance
with the order of a state commissioner. These prices resulted in in-
come to the corporation which was permitted the benefit of a 27.5
percent oil depletion allowance. When the state's price order was sub-
sequently vacated,.Skelly was required, to make repayments to two of
its customers for previous overcharges. 4 2 Thereafter, Skelly Oil at-
tempted to deduct these payments refunded to customers as an ordi-
nary business expense." The Supreme Court held, however, that the
corporation was not entitled to a full deduction for the payments re-
funded in 1958, but rather must subtract from this deduction the
amount earlier received as a tax benefit accruing from the depletion
allowance.44 Paralleling the reasoning of Arrowsmith, the Court stated
that permitting both an oil depletion allowance and a later full deduc-
tion would result in a windfall to the taxpayer. 45
In order to demonstrate the applicability of the Arrowsmith-Skelly
rationale to the instant fact situation, the majority in Cummings
reasoned that the section 16(b) liability had a logical nexus not only
with the later purchase but also with the earlier sale. 46 The court as-
serted that this interrelationship between sale and repurchase was ap-
normal higher rate. For example, a taxpayer who is in a 50% tax bracket in year one
receives a sum, $12,000, which is taxed as a long-term capital gain. He therefore pays
tax on 112 of $12,000 at 50% or $3,000. In year two, if the taxpayer has repaid the
$12,000 and is allowed to deduct it front ordbiary income subject to the full 50% rate,
he will realize a tax savings of $6,000. That is, the taxpayer will not only have recouped
his earlier $3,000 tax payment, but will have gained a windfall profit of an additional
$3,000 as well. If the deduction were limited to a capital loss, the taxpayer would he al-
lowed to subtract the $12,000 only from cajital gains, IN. REv, Cone or 1954, §
1211(b). Therefore, if he had $12,000 capital gain in year two from which he sub-
tracted his loss, his savings would be only $3,000, the long-term capital gain tax for his
bracket. If there were not capital gains, however, the taxpayer could deduct the capital
loss from ordinary income only to the extent of $1,000 a year. INT. REv. Coin: or 1954,
§ 1211(b) with a carry-over provision, INT. Rev, CODE or 1954, § 1212.
a 344 U.S. at 9.
"Id. at 7-8.
4] Id.
42 394 U.S. at 685.
." Id, at (179.
Id. at 684.
45 Id. at 684-85.
" 506 F.2d at 451.
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parent from the essential nature of a section 16(b) repayment, because
without the initial sale, no section 16(b) violation would have
occurred. 47
 Once an interrelationship between sale and repurchase is
shown, then by analogy to Arrowsmith, the loss incurred as a result of
the section 16(b) repayment could be viewed as arising from the profit
or financial gain the taxpayer had received by repurchasing the stock
at a lower price.'" The court asserted that the amount of the repay-
ment, calculated as the difference in price between the sale and re-
purchase, is, in essence, a recognition of the monetary gain accruing
to the taxpayer as a result of the interaction of these two
transactions.'" Since the same set of transactions which provided the
taxpayer with a gain resulted in a subsequent loss, the court reasoned
that the loss can be characterized in the same manner as the profits. 5 "
Therefore, because the profits from the earlier sale had been taxed at
a capital gains rate, the majority in Cummings held that the section
16(b) repayment should he limited to capital loss treatment." In sup-
port of this conclusion, the court noted that an ordinary deduction of
the same money that was earlier taxed at a preferential rate would un-
justly enrich the defendant by allowing him to receive an undeserved
windfal1.52 Thus, in addition to providing the Second Circuit with a
means of characterizing a loss transaction which is not expressly iden-
tified in the Internal Revenue Code, 53 but which is closely related to
an earlier gain, the Arrowsmith and Skelly cases also provided a policy
reason which the court used to support its characterization.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Smith contended that Arrowsmith
and Skelly should not have been controlling in the Cummings situation,
because the touchstone of both earlier cases is "the repayment of an
amount which had previously been included in income."" In contrast,
the amount required to be repaid by Cummings under section 16(b)
was not the same amount which had previously been included in
income.'" The only amount that had been treated as income and
taxed was the profit from the initial sale, which was taxed at capital
gains rates." No tax was levied upon the "financial gain" that al-
legedly accrued to the taxpayer as a result of the sale-repurchase
17m .
4 " 344 U.S. at 8-9.
" 506 F.2d at 451. In addition, the court also suggested that a § 16(b) repayment
could be characterized as an adjustment upward of the original sales price to take into
account the profits gained. Id.
"Id. at 451; Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304, 1307 (7th Cir. 1973).
See Arrawsmith, 344 U.S. at 8.
" 506 F.2d at 449.
5z Id. at 451. See Shelly Oil, 394 U.S. at 684-86. See generally Arrowsmith, 344 U.S. at
7-9.
53 LOkkell, Tax Significance of Payments in Satisfaction of Liabilities Arising Under Sec-
tion 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 4 C... L. REv. 298, 306 (1970).
5a
	F.2d at 453 (concurring opinion).
55 Id. at 454.
."
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combination and which constituted the amount of the section 16(b)
repayment." Therefore, to equate the sales profit with the section
16(b) profit was inaccurate." The set of transactions which gave rise
to the profit which had previously been included in'income" was not
the same set which gave rise to the loss, i.e., the repayment." Under
these circumstances Judge Smith reasoned that Arrowsmith should be
inapplicable."'
Judge Smith further argued that since the section 16(h) "profits"
in the Cummings fact situation never had any significance as profits for
tax purposes, it was difficult to maintain that allowing their deduction
would be equivalent to permitting favorable tax treatment twice."'
This contention could be maintained only by viewing the section 16(b)
repayment as being paid from the profits of the earlier sale, which
were taxed at capital gain rates. However, such an assertion is errone-
ous because section 16(h) liability may result even if no profits were
realized from the initial sale."
The Tax Court, in rejecting the Arrowsmith - Skelly rationale, relied
not only on similar arguments, but also noted that unlike Arrowsmith,
the loss suffered by the taxpayer in a section 16(b) violation is not in-
curred in the same capacity or status as the gain."' More specifically,
in Arrowsmith, the taxpayers' liability for corporate debts arose out of
their shareholder status, the same status which had earlier entitled
them to gains when the corporation was liquidated. 1 i 5 The gains and
losses were thus suffered in the same capacity. By comparison, the
court stated, in a section 16(b) violation, the taxpayer acquires his
gains in the market in his capacity as an investor, while his liability
57 id. See also William L. Mitchell, 52 T.C. 170, 174-75 (1969); Nelson, ,s-upro. note
31, at 335.
" 506 F.2d at 454 (concurring opinion). See also William L. Mitchell, 52 T.C. 170,
174-75 (1969); Nelson„tuprn note 31, at 335.
5 ' The first set of transactions was the original purchase ;aid sale which resulted
in a profit and was taxable.
6" The set of transactions which resulted in the § 16(b) loss was the sale-purchase
combination. The confusion here centers upon the fact that the sale-purchase combina-
tion can result in a financial gain fur the taxpayer, i.e., if the taxpayer sold 10 shares
for a total of $20 and later purchases 10 shares at a total of $ in, he not only has his 10
original shares but he has also pocketed $10. This financial gain is the "profit" that §
16(h) is designed to eliminate. But, it should he noted that these "profits" have no tax
significance. See Nelson, supra note 31, at 335.
" 1 506 F.2d at 153-54 (concurring opinion). Amwsmith requires that the transac-
tion which gave rise to the taxable profits be the same transaction which resulted in the
loss. Here the purchase-sale gave rise to taxable profits, while the sale-repurchase re-
sulted in a "loss" through § 16(b) repayment, Id.
"N. at 453-54.
"See William L. Mitchell, 52 T.C. 170. 174-75 (1969). For example, if a taxpayer
bought at $20, held the stock for a year, sold at $10 and purchased at $8 within the
next 6 months, the net result would be a $10 loss ($20410). However, the § 16(b)
"profit" would be $2 ($1048).
" 4 Nathan Cummings, 60 T.C. 91, 94-95 (1973). The same reasoning was used by ,
the Tax Court in James E. Anderson, 56 T.C. 1370, 1374-75 (1971).
"s 344 U.S. at 8-9.
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under section 16(b) is predicated on his insider status." Since the
gains are acquired in a different capacity than the losses, the court
decided that the nexus between the transactions was insufficient to
bring the .Arrowsmith rationale into play."
The conclusion that the taxpayer acquires his gains in the mar-
ket solely as an investor, however, is in some instances questionable."
It appears that the substance of the Arrowsmith holding is directed
primarily toward the relationship of the loss to the earlier favorably
treated gains, 69 not toward the status of the taxpayer during these
transactions. 7° Therefore, the Tax Court's attempt to use the change
in status argument as a measure of the applicability of Arrowsmith has
justifiably been criticizedn and rejected by the circuit courts which
have considered the matter."
It is submitted that an Arrowsmith analogy should not be applied
to a section 16(b) situation. Application of Arrouismith appears to be
contingent upon the existence of' a certain type of factual pattern,"
namely one in which the taxpayer, while maintaining the same status,
is involved in two taxable and integrally related transactions — a gain
w Nathan Cummings, 00 T.C. 91, 94-95 (1973): See also James E. Anderson, 56
T.C. 1370, 1374.75 (1971); Note, 9 FlcsusroN L. REV. 841, 848 (1972).
" Nathan Cummings, 60 T.C. 91, 94-95 (1973). See also James E. Anderson, 56
T.C. 1370, 1374-75 (1971); Note, 9 Hous -roN L. REV. 841, 848 (1972).
" For instance, in Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973),
where Anderson sold his stock in order to raise money to purchase shares under an
employment stock purchase agreement, it would appear that the Seventh Circuit could
also argue that the taxpayer had the same employee status when he received both his
financial gains and his § 16(b) losses. It is submitted, however, that the I.R.S.' allowance
of favorable tax treatment for bonus employment compensation plans, INT. REV. CODE
c: 1954, §§ 422, 423, 424, indicates sanctioning of some insider trading. The taxpayer
could then posit that the selling of stock solely to raise funds for entering into an em-
ployment compensation program is not likely to lead to the speculative abuse which
§ 10(b) attempts to discourage. Therefore, in the above circumstances, the standard set
forth in Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 601-03
(1973), would operate to carve out an exemption from § 16(b) liability. Kern County in-
volved a rather "unorthodox" stock transaction whereby stock was acquired through a
tender offer and then, under the terms of a binding merger agreement, exchanged
within a six month period. In holding that the stock dealings in question were not viola-
tive of § 16(b) the Court suggested a possible § 16(b) defense, i.e., exemption of stock
transactions which do not afford "measurable possibilities for speculative abuse"
through the use of insider information. Id. at 602. Cummings' attempt to utilize this de-
fense in the instant case, however, was unsuccessful. 506 F.2d at 452.
" See Rabinovitz, Effect of Prior Year's Transactions on Federal Income Tax Conse-
quences of Current Receipts or Payments, 28 TAX L. RE v. 85, 106 -09 (1972).
" See Kimbell v. United States, 490 F.2d 203, 204-05 (5th Cir. 1974); ,fames E.
Anderson, 56 T.C. 1370, 1378 (1971) (dissenting opinion). See also Lokken, supra note
47, at 306; Note, 9 FlousToN L. REv. 841, 848-49 (1972).
" Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304, 1307 (7th Cir. 1973).
"Id. It can be assumed that the Second Circuit found the Tax Court's argument
less than convincing, as evidenced by its continuing application of the Arrowsmith ap-
proach. Cummings, 506 F.2d at 450-51.
Ts Lokken, supra note 53, at 306.
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followed by a loss. 74 Thorough examination of the Cummings situation
indicates a wide discrepancy between the facts of Arrowsmith and those
of Cunnings, in which the subsequent loss is a result of the application
of external statutory , requirements to a single occurrence — a
purchase/sale combination within a six month period, without primary
reference to the individual economic aspects of either transaction.
These factual differences cast serious doubts upon the propriety of
applying Arrowsmith principles to deny an ordinary business expense
deduction to a section I 6(b) violator. Furthermore, A rrowsmith's only
concern was with the windfall which results from are difference be-
tween allowance of an ordinary loss as compared to allowance of a
capital loss." The windfall in a section 16(b) situation, however, is en-
tirely different, as it arises from repayment of a statutory fine. As
. such, the capital nature of the stock 'transactions involved is in many
instances irrelevant.
The examination so far has been limited to whether a capital
deduction or' an ordinary deduction is appropriate. However, a third
alternative — denial of any deduction — should be considered since
the loss results from a statutory fine. Since the legislature has deter-
mined that a line should be exacted for the violation of section 16(b),
should the court reduce the impact of that fine by allowing the vio-
lator to deduct the cost of his section 16(b) repayment?
The Supreme Court has established that a fine payment does
not qualify for any deduction at all. 76 In fact, the argument. against al-
lowance of a deduction for payment of a fine has evolved into a well
established judicial principle — the "frustration doctrine." 77 Broadly
stated, this judicial principle dictates that tax deductions which would
" Although the application of the A -r -row,s- mith-Skelly rationale to the reverse of the
Curnmingv situation—a purchase-sale violation § 16(b)----has not been judicially tested,
the propriety or its use was suggested by judge Smith in his concurring opinion. 506
F.2(1 at 454 (concurring opinion). Unlike a sale-repurchase combination, the amount of
repayment in a puttltase-sale transaction is exactly equal to the amount of profits from
the sale, thereby undercutting the primary defense that no correlation exists between
amount of repayment and profits earned. To illustrate, assume that stock was pur-
chased at $5 and within six months sold at $10. The amount of profits—$5—woukl
equal the § 16(b) liability of $5 (sales price of $10 minus purchase price of $5), It is
submitted, however, that the taxpayer should be allowed an ordinary business deduc-
tion to oft -set his tax kiss rather than tire more restricted capital loss deduction. Assum-
ing that the taxpayer is in a 50 percent tax bracket, an ordinary deduction of the $5
repayment would yield a tax benefit of $2.50—an amount equal to the short-term capi-
tal gains tax earlier paid on his $5 profit. On the other hand, if' only a capital loss was
allowed, the taxpayer would still be losing part of the tax on his $5 profit, in addition to
the loss of his insider profit. See Nekon, supra mite 31, at 344-45,
73
 In iirrounruith, the windfall which the Court sought to prevent was the amount
of money the taxpayer would have received if the second transaction was identified as
an ordinary rather than a capital loss. 344 U.S. at 7. See note 38 SUPITi.
7"
 Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38, 40 (1958): Tank
Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1958).
77
 Hoover Motor Express Co., 356 U.S. 38, 39-40 (1958): Tank Truck Rentals,
Inc, v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 33-36 (1958).
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frustrate sharply defined legislative policies should be denied." In
support of the doctrine, it is argued that the judiciary should guard
against indirectly rewarding a taxpayer for his misdeeds." This re-
ward, taking the form of a tax deduction, would reduce the amount
of the violator's repayment8° and could very well put him in a better
financial position than before the violation." Either of these benefits
would seem to indicate judicial condonation of present wrongdoing
and encouragement of future violations. 82 To prevent this undermin-
ing effect on statutory penalties, the frustration doCtrine has been ap-
plied in the past whenever congressional legislative policy would be
subverted by allowance of a tax deduction."
The Second Circuit in Cummings," in accordance with at least
one other circuit," found the rationale of the frustration doctrine
convincing and adopted this principle to justify the denial of ordinary.
deductions to section 16(b) violators engaged in sale-purchase
transactions." Although the amount deductible under capital loss
provisions is less than the amount deductible under ordinary business
loss provisions, the capital loss treatment is still more favorable,than
no deduction at all. In this sense the security laws are still frustrated
by the allowance of a capital deduction.
Confusion arises from the fact that the court appears to equate
the unjust enrichment" problem of the frustration doctrine with the
unjust enrichment problem of Arrowsmith. The two concepts, however,
are quite different. The frustration doctrine operates broadly to deny
all deductions which would detract from the effective enforcement of
section 16(b). Under the facts of Cummings, any deduction, whether
capital or ordinary, could reduce the severity of the economic impact
of the fine" and thereby unjustly enrich the taxpayer. Thus, the de-
" See Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 33-34, 35-36
(1958); Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 473 (1943); Jerry Rossman Corp. v.
Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711, 713 (2d Cir. 1949), rev'g 10 T.C. 468 (1948); Darrell, The
Tax Treatment of Payments Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange /fa of 1934, 64
HARV. L. RV.v. 80, 90-92 (1950); Lokken, supra note 53, at 300-04.
7" Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304, 1307-08 (7th Cir. 1073); Lokken,
supra note 53, at 312, 321.
• Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304, 1307-08 (7th Cir. 1973).
• Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 36 (1958).
" Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304, 1307.08 (7th Cir. 1973); Lokken,
supra note 53, at 321. See note 31 supra for an example of how a lax deduction would
allow the taxpayer to repay less than his full § 16(b) line, thereby frustrating the opera-
tion of § 16(h).
• 506 F.2d at 449-50.
" 5 See Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304, 1307-08 (7th Cir. 1973).
"See note 31 supra for an example illustrating the need for withholding a deduc-
tion in a sale-purchase situation.
" Enrichment results from any deduction which either puts the violator in a bet-
ter financial condition than before the violation or reduces the amount of the violator's
repayment.
" The Cummings court acknowledged that an ordinary business deduction would
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nial of any such deduction would be required by the frustration doc-
trine. On the other hand, the only enrichment problem presented in
Arrowsmith is how to eliminate the tax benefits gained from the charac-
terization of a loss as ordinary rather than capital where the same
amount had previously been taxed at capital gains rates." Although
the Cummings court condemns the windfalls described in both
Arrowsmith and the frustration doctrine cases," the majority acts only
to prevent the Skelly-Arrowsmith type windfall."' The ultimate result
flowing from the characterization of .the section 16(b) repayment as a
capital loss is that the taypayer is still able to avoid the full impact of a
section 16(b) fine, albeit to a lesser extent than if an ordinary loss was
allowed." To avoid this result, it is submitted that a better approach
would be to give force to the frustration doctrine by denying a deduc-
tion whenever its allowance would reduce the taxpayer's section 16(b)
fi ne."
This suggestion, however, should be qualified in at least one re-
spect. The frustration doctrine should not operate automatically to
deny a deduction in every case in which a statutory fine is exacted.
For example, where a taxpayer has suffered additional losses beyond
that of his statutory line, it appears that allowance of an ordinary de-
duction to offset these secondary expenses"' would neither decrease
the effective operation of the statute nor suggest judicial approbation
of wrongdoing."' On the contrary, "to deny the deduction [in the
above situation] would be, in effect, to multiply the penalty beyond
what Congress intended.""" Therefore, it is desirable both to deny a
deduction where its allowance would frustrate public policy and, con-
frustrate the operation of § 16(b). 506 F.2d at 452. It is submitted that the same result
will follow if a capital loss is allowed, although the fine will be reduced to a lesser ex-
tent. See Nelson, Tax Deductibility vl Insider Prom Repayments: Resolving an Apparent
Conflict, 24 CASE W. Rs:s. L. REv. 330, 340 (1973). Although lack of information makes it
impossible to calculate the amount ()I' reduction ClatIllningS received through allowance
of a capital loss, elaboration of the example in note 38 supra, may illustrate how allow-
ing even a capital loss will violate the frustration doctrine. Assume the loss in the note
38 hypothetical is the result of a line payment, The ordinary loss deduction would in
effect be a partial rebate, because the taxpayer could offset $12,000 of income and re-
duce the taxes he would otherwise have to pay by $6,000. Thus, the net effect is that
his § I6(b) fine only amounts to $6,000. The tax savings From a capital loss, $3,000,
however, is also a partial rebate, lessening the impact of the fine repayment. Assuming
that the statutorily determined amount of the fine was calculated to discourage re-
cidivism, a lessening of that amount could increase the likelihood of recurring viola-
tions.
" 344 U.S. at 7-9. See also note 38 supra.
"" 506 F.2d at 451-52.
'I See text at notes 45-54 supra.
" See Nelson, supra note 88, at 340. See also note 88 supra.
"506 F.2d at 452; Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304, 1307-08 (7t1) Cir.
1973).
"' See note 74 supra.
" Laurence M. Marks, 27 T.C. 464, 468-69 (1956).
11 ° See Darrell, supra note 78, at 92.
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versely, to allow a deduction where its denial would only supplement
a legislative fine. These two considerations can be integrated into one
standard by asking, in every repayment-deduction situation, whether a
deduction would "enrich"" 7
 the taxpayer. If the answer is yes, then a
deduction should be denied under the frustration doctrine."" Con-
versely, if the answer is no, the denial of a deduction would merely
impose additional hardship on the taxpayer beyond that dictated by
the statute" and the judicial policy against allowing the tax system to
further sanction the individual for his wrongdoing would require the
allowance of the deduction.'"
This approach not only encompasses the concerns of both the
frustration doctrine and the policy against judicial supplementation of
legislative sanctions but also, and more importantly, it takes into con-
sideration the overlapping of congressional policies by balancing the
interest of the tax system in imposing taxes only on net income"'
with the policy against frustrating the legislative intent in setting the
section 16(b) fine."2 Where the effective enforcement of a "clearly
defined statutory scheme" would be subverted by allowing a tax de-
duction, then the statutory interest is paramount to that of the tax
system.'" On the other hand, if denial of a deduction only increases
the penalty above that prescribed by the legislature, the policy against
frustration of legislative intent is served "imperfectly, if at all." 104
 The
interests of the tax system are subverted by taxation of money which
is not net income."' Since neither objective is furthered whenever a
denial of the deduction would exact a fine greater than that required
by statute,'" a deduction should be allowed in such cases' 07 under
section 162(a). 1 "
" 7 See note 87 supra.
9" Cummings, 506 F.2d at 452; Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304,
1307-08 (7th Cir. 1973).
" Nelson, supra note 88, at 343. For a detailed analysis of transactional combina-
tions which deserve special lax treatment, see Nelson, supra note 88, at 343-54.	 -
" 0 Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691, 694-95 (1966).
11 ' Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691.92 (1966); Commissioner v. Sulli-
van, 356 U.S. 27, 29 (1958).
1112
 Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1958).
1" See Lokken, Tax Sign?ficance of Payments in Satisfaction of Liabilities Arising Under
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act (21'1934, 4 GA. L. REv. 298, 301 -02.
15)4 Id. at 302.
'" See generally Lokken,,supra note 103, at 301 -02.
7" Indeed, assuming that Congress intended § 16(b) to be precisely tailored to the
culpability of the insider's violation, then any court action which either increases or de-
creases the amount of the fine would he judicial interference with legislative intent. See
Nelson, supra note 88, at 343.
107 Laurence M. Marks, 27 T.C. 464 (1956), is unique in that it is the only case to
date in which the violation resulted from a purchase and sale rather than a sale and re-
purchase. This distinction between the sale-repurchase and purchase-sale combinations
is crucial. See Nelson, supra note 88, at 344-48, for an extensive treatment of the signifi-
cance of the differences between these two transactional arrangements.
'See note 6 supra. Of course, when the insider invoked is merely a shareholder
rather than an officer or director, a different statutory basis for the deduction may be
118
NOTES
Where a section 162(a) deduction in the year of repayment
would be insufficient to offset the amount of capital gains tax previ-
ously paid on a purchase-sale transaction, 109 the tax consequences of
the section 16(b) violation conceivably could be determined under sec-
tion 1341(a) of the Code."° This section is designed to alleviate the
inequities which result when a taxpayer, who has received income and
paid a tax on it, subsequently discovers that his right to such income is
incomplete and repayment must be made. Since a deduction in the
amount of the tax paid in the previous year would be less valuable if
the taxpayer is in a lower income bracket in the subsequent year, sec-
tion 1341(a) affords the taxpayer the option of taking a credit in the
year of repayment."'
The Service, however, has held that section 1341(a) is not ap-
plicable where money was received because of a mistake in fact; that
is, where the taxpayer had access to all the facts which would have es-
tablished that he was not entitled to the fund at the time the sum was
receivcd. 12 Although the money from insider trading could be consi-
dered money received under a mistake in law rather than in fact, it
necessary. Section 212 of the INTERNAL REVENUE CODE or 1954, a provision designed to
afford a deduction to a person who is not in business but who has incurred expenses
similar to those enumerated in § 162(a) may, however, provide the shareholder with the
tax treatment desired. See Nelson, supra note 88, at 354-56.
"" Such situations occur when income decreases, repayment is in a different year
than the violation, and the violative transactions were a purchase and sale. See Nelson,
supra note 88 ., at 349-50. Conversely, given the same circumstances as above except that
income increases, the deduction taken in the later year will be worth more than if it was
taken in the year of violation. A Revenue Ruling requiring the § 16(b) line be paid as
soon as possible after the violation may be necessary to prevent taxpayers from attempt-
ing to schedule their repayments in a later year.
n" The section provides:
If (1) an item was included in gross income for a prior taxable year (or
years) because it appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to
such item; (2) a deduction is allowable for the taxable year because it was
established after the close of such prior taxable year (or years) that the
taxpayer did not have an unrestricted right to such item or to a portion of
such item; and (3) the amount of such deduction exceeds $3000, then the
tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year shall be the lesser of the
following: (4) the tax for the taxable year computed with such deduction;
or (5) an amount equal to (A) the tax for the taxable year computed with-
out such deduction, minus (B) the decrease in tax under this chapter (or
the corresponding provisions of prior revenue laws) for the prior taxable
year (or years) which would result solely from the exclusion of such item
(or portion thereof) from gross income for such prior taxable year (or
years) ....
IN•, REV. Coot: or 1954, § 1341(a). Both Nelson, supra note 88, at 350, and Lokken,
supra note 103, at 315-20, argue that § 1341(a) was designed to alleviate inequalities by
permitting an adjustment in the present tax year for a transaction which occurred and
had tax significance in a previous year. Therefore, if it can be shown that in a § 16(b)
situation the initial profits from the purchase-sale appear to be a fund to which the
taxpayer has an unrestricted right, then that taxpayer should be eligible for a § 134I(a)
deduction. See also Rabinovitz, supra note 69, at 129, 135-52 (1972).
" I See Nelson, supra note 8$, at 350.
" Rev. Rul. 68.153, 1968-1 Cum. BULL. 371.
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has been suggested that this distinction should not justify a different
result as to the applicability of section 1341(a), because in either case
the taxpayer had access to information defeating his claim at the time
of the receipt of the money." 2 In addition, it has been argued that
section 1341(a) should •be applicable because: (1) the Service's in-
terpretation of section 1341(a), as applied to section 16(b) repayments,
could violate the policy against using the tax system to impose extra
financial penalties on offenders;" 4 and (2) congressional intent in
enacting section 1341(a), as expressed in the language of the section
itself, requires only that the right "appear" to be unrestricted.'"
Nevertheless, the courts have not yet recognized section 1341(a) as
applicable to the section , 16(b) situation and absent such judicial rec-
ognition, the taxpayer's deduction would be restricted to a section
162(a) deduction in the year of repayment."'
One commentator has suggested that the Code might prohibit
use of the public policy Argument as a basis for denying deductions to
insiders.''' The argument is premised on a 1968 amendment to sec-
tion 162(f) of the Code which purports to deny deductions for the
payment of any "fine or•similar penalty."'" Although this new provi-
sion was designed to codify the frustration doctrine," 9 it includes only
fines payable to a government.' 20 Since a section 16(b) fine is paid to
the corporation, it may be outside the scope of section 162(f).
Moreover, the fact that the committee report accompanying the
amendment clearly states that section 162(f) is intended to be all
inclusive"' could preclude independent use of the public policy ar-
gument as a ground for denial of a deduction. 122 In summary, if a
section 16(b) fine is not covered by the language of section 162(f) and
a deduction cannot be denied for public policy reasons outside section
162(f), the courts may be left with no alternative but to allow a deduc-
tion.
On the other hand, there are strong arguments that support de-
nial of a deduction where required by public policy. First, it should be
"3 Nelson, supra note 88, at 351. See also Lokken, supra note 103, at 319 nn.99,
114 See Nelson, supra note 88, at 351.
"5 Id.
1161d .
" 7 Id. at 369-60.
" 2 1N-r. REV. CODE or 1954, § 162(1), amending 1N"F. Rev, CODE: OF 1954, § 162.
The new amendment to the Code, § 162(0, provides as follows: "No deduction shall be
allowed under subsection (a) 1§ 162(a) I for any Fine or penalty paid to a government
for the violation of any law."
" 2 Nelson, supra note 88, at 360.
• 12 ° See note 118 supra.
'at "The provision for the denial of the deduction for payments in these situa-
tions which are deemed to violate public policy is intended to be all inclusive." SENATE
COMM. ON FINANCE., TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 274
(1969).
122 See generally Nelson, supra note 88, at 360.
100.
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noted that the all inclusive" language of the committee report is di-
rectly followed by the comment that "[F•]ublic policy, in other circum-
stances, generally is not sufficiently clearly defined to justify the disal-
lowance of deductions." 123 The public policy surrounding the enact-
ment and enforcement of section 16(b), however, could hardly be de-
scribed as not well defined. 124 Since the abuses of insider trading are
widely condemned, it would seem logical to create an exception to the
"all inclusive" language of section 162(a) and allow use of the frustra-
tion doctrine to deny a deduction in a section 16(b) situation."' In-
deed, the inference that can be drawn from the committee report —
that public policy is still a developing concept — indicates support for
the continued use of public policy beyond that set forth in section
162(f). 126 Furthermore, the fact that section 162(f) was recently sup-
plemented by an additional Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.]
regulation"' argues against the total inclusive nature of the 1968 pro-
vision. Even if the supplementary E regulations are regarded as ex-
planatory rather than expansive, an argument could be made that
under these new provisions the corporation, as the recipient of the
insider's fine is, in essence, functioning solely as an agent or instru-
mentality of the government. Accepting the characterization of a cor-
poration as a government instrument would thereby bring a section
16(b) fine within the scope of section 162(f).
Another possible interpretation of section 162(f) and the rele-
vant legislative history is that the failure to include a section 16(b) fine
within the new statutory provision was inadvertent.'" However, even
if there was no legislative oversight, it is submitted that the public pol-
icy argument should be available to deny a deduction to an insider,
since allowance of a section 16(6) fine deduction would undermine
clearly established public policy in the same manner as would allow-
ance of a section 162(f) fine deduction."$
The application of the frustration doctrine may be affected by
other considerations.' 3 ° One pressing question is whether the fact that
123 SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE. TAN REFORM ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 552, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess, 274 (1969).
'" SENATE Comm. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S.
REP, No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934).
'" See Nelson, Apra nute 88, at 360.
120 id.
'" Treas. Regs. § 1.162-21 (1975) provides in part:
"(a) In general. No deduction shall be allowed under section 162(a) fur any fine or
similar penalty paid to (1) the government of the United States ... (3) A political sub-
division of', or corporation or other entity serving as an agency or instrumentality of,
any of the above."
"" It may he that since no court has yet attempted to deny a deduction to a §
16(b) violator under § 162(f), the § 16(b) problem has never been brought to the atten-
tion of the legislators.
"" The allowance of both types of fine deductions would undermine clearly es-
tablished public policy by subsidizing the fine which in turn would weaken the deter-
rent effect of the fine.
00 Such other considerations include voluntariness of the repayment, see text at
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a fine was paid voluntarily rather than after an adjudication of liabil-
ity should have an impact on the tax treatment of a violator.' 3 '
The position articulated by the Second Circuit in Cummings is
that since defenses to a section 16(b) charge are difficult to assert suc-
cessfully, the statute operates almost automatically. 132 Therefore,
bifurcation of the tax treatment of the section 16(b) repayment ac-
cording to whether liability was judicially determined would subvert
the intent of the statute.' 33 Under the Second Circuit's analysis, it. ap-
pears that the "Waxpayer's subjective motive for making a settlement
payment is irrelevant to the determination of its deductibility."'"
It is suggested that if the voluntariness issue is analyzed in terms
of its impact on public policy rather than in terms of its affect on de-
ductibility, the voluntary repayment problem is more easily under-
stood and the correctness of the circuit court's approach will become
apparent. Generally, a voluntary repayment only avoids the almoSt in-
evitable judicial finding of liability.'" Assuming that a section 16(b)
fine does lessen the likelihood that a violation will recur, 1 " then
granting a deduction only to an insider who voluntarily repaid would
undercut the deterrent effect of the section 16(b) fine by, in effect,
reducing the amount of his fine.'" This conclusion is substantiated by
notes 132-142 infra, and any of a number of possible defenses to a § 16(b) charge, such
as a claim that the challenged transactions came within the Kerns County exception, Kern
County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 601-03 (1973), see note
68 supra, or a more technical challenge that the individual does not qualify as an officer
or director, Alder v. Klawans, 267 F2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959). See Cummings, 506 F.2d at
452-53.
'' Charles I. Brown, 32 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 1300, 1302 (1973). See Cummings,
5011 F.2d at 452; Nathan Cummings, 60 T.C. 91, 95-96 (1973); William L. Mitchell, 52
T.C. 170, 175-76 (1969); Laurence M. Marks, 27 T.C. 464, 467-70 (1956).
lax
	 •.2d at 452-53.
l" Id.
'" Kimbell v. United States, 490 F.2d 203, 204 (5th Cir. 1974). See Cummings, 506
F.2d at 452.
See Lokken. supra note 103 at 312-13 (1970). Of course, if there was not al-
most automatic enforcement of § 16(h), so that viable defenses became available, the
impact of these defenses would require a reconsideration of the repayment before ad-
• udication issue.
1 " This assumption could account for the difference between the Tax and Cir-
cuit Court approaches. See Charles I. Brown, 32 Cal Tax Ct. Meru. 1300, 1302 (1973);
Nathan Cummings, 60 T.C. 91, 95-96 (1973); William L. Mitchell, 52 T.C. 170, 175-76
(1969); Laurence M. Marks, 27 T.C. 464, 467-70 (1956). That is, if the Tax Court re-
jects this assumption, instead adopting the position that the imposition of a fine on an
inadvertent violator probably has a minimum impact on recidivism, then allowing a de-
duction for the repayment seems reasonable. A problem arises, however, from the fact
that the decision to fine inadvertent violators was legislative. While the wisdom of that
decision ilia),
 be questionable, if a change is needed it should be made directly by the
legislators and not through the circuitous reasoning of the courts. Therefore, it is sub-
mitted that the better approach is that adopted by the circuit courts.
"7 In essence, a voluntary repentor would stiller less than the lull amount of his
fine in a sale-purchase situation regardless of his culpability. See Lokken, supra note
103, at 313. On the other hand, allowing such a deduction would place a premium on
the timeliness of the repayment.
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an I.R.S. ruling that. denies deductions for any amount '"[plaid in
settlement. of the taxpayer's actual or potential liability for a fine or
penalty (civil) or criminal ...."'•'' This ruling refers to section 162(f)
fines and, as yet, there has been no judicial determination whether
the section 162(1) lines encompass a line under section 16(b)."" How-
ever, even if the section 16(b) repayment is not included, the same
public policy considerations which support the I.R.S. ruling with re-
gard to section 162(f) fines are also applicable to a section 162(a) re-
payment. Therefore, by analogy, no deduction should be allowed to
the insider who pays a potential liability before it. has been judicially
determined, where the same payment, if made under judicial compul-
sion, would not be deductible.
It is submitted that the foregoing analysis demonstrates that the
judiciary has the necessary means to equitably resolve the deduction
problem. To date, the courts have not taken full advantage of the
most appropriate and best reasoned of these rationales—the frustra-
tion doctrine and its correllary, the policy against supplementation of
Statutory fines through the tax system. Instead, the circuit courts,
preoccupied with an undiscerning .desire for uniformity,"?, have
stretched the principles of the Arrowsmith and Skelly cases to encom-
pass the section 16(b) situation. Concurrently, the Tax Court., moti-
vated by a similar desire,"' has perfunctorily employed the business
expense argument to justify deductions without discriminating among
different fact patterns." 2 The deficiencies in the reasoning of both
the circuit courts and the Tax Court have caused concern among
members of the judiciary and legal commentators and have inspired
the creation of several alternative plans.
The concurring opinion in Cummings recommended that the sec-
tion 16(b) repayment be added to the basis 
theory
the purchased stock.' 43
As explained by one commentator,t the addition-to-
basis plan is to restore the sale-purchase violator to the same position
he occupied before engaging in the transactions."' Such a restoration
serves as a compromise between the public policy interest of denying
an ordinary deduction and the tax interest of allowing a full deduc-
t"" Treas. kegs. § L62-21(h)(iii) (1975).
"" See text at notes l 17-130 mipra.
14" This desire for uniformity is evident from the fat that the court. in Cummings
heavily relied on Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir, 1973) and Mitch-
ell v. Commissioner, 42H F.2(1 259 (Gi lt Cir. 1970) which are the only two prior circuit
court pronouncements on the subject. 506 1.2(1 at 450.
" 1 See generally. Nelson, supra note 88, at 339-40.
142 See Nelson, .s. upra note 88, at 334 n.19, 339-40.
" 3 506 F.2d at 454 (concurring opinion). This alternative, lirst suggested in a
concurring ()pillion in William L. Mitchell, 52 T.C, 170, 176 (1969) (concurring opin-
ion) has been given c(rtnprehensive I reil intent by 1..(tkken, supra note 103, at 309.15,
320-21. See aim) Cummings, 506 F.2(1. at 453.
" Lnkkell, Sit7r(i note 103, at 309-15, 320-21.
L-I5 Id. at 309-11, 311 n.69.
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tion for any business expenses." Since in a sale-purchase violation,
the expense of the section 16(b) fine actually makes the cost of reac-
quiring the stock higher than is indicated by the purchase price, this
increased expenditure is taken into account by adding the cost of the
section 16(b) fine to the basis of the repurchased stock."' The result
of this linking does not become apparent until the stock is again sold,
at which time the addition to basis will effect a reduction in capital
gains or, in some instances, a capital loss.'" A major obstacle to adop-
tion of this approach, however, as noted by the Cummings court, is
that an addition to basis would exact a penalty from the violator
beyond that prescribed in section I6(b) by deferring the recognition
of the loss until a later date—the time of the sale of the repurchased
stock.' 4 " In addition, the analogy between the section 16(b) repayment
and the increased cost of the stock is inaccurate, because the section
16(b) fine is not a Function of the cost of acquiring the stock but re-
sults from the violator's status as an insider. 15 "
Another commentator, dissatisfied with both the Tax Court and
circuit court approaches, recommends the use of public policy consid-
erations as the touchstone of deductibility.' 5 ' OF primary importance
in the design of this plan for implementing the goals embodied in sec-
tion 16(b) and the tax system is a case by case determination of the
economic impact of the section 16(b) repayment. 152 Once the
economic effect of the violation on the insider has been assessed, a de-
duction would be allowed only to the extent necessary to offset any
tangential losses.'" In this respect, the ultimate objective would be the
creation of a system in which repayment of a section 16(b) profit
would have no effect on the tax liability of the insider. After the
amount of the deduction necessary to achieve a "no tax" effect has
been computed, the public policy rationales, i.e., the frustration doc-
trine and the doctrine against supplementation of statutory fines, to-
gether with Code section 162(a)' 54 can be invoked to justify the treat-
ment or the section I6(b) violator.
This "no tax" effect approach may supply the guiding principle
needed for resolving the repayment-deductibility problem by placing
the emphasis on the public policy concerns and the individual
taxpayer's economic situation. As seen from the analysis in the
Cummings case and the general patchwork treatment given the deduc-
"" hi. at 320-21.
'" Nelson, supra note 88, at 347.
"" 506 F.2d at 453 & n.11.
"9 Id. at 453.
I" Nelson, supra note 88, at 347-48.
" 1
 Nelson, supra note 88. at 340-61.
' 32 Id. at 343. Such an approach is imperative because of the numerous transac-
tional combinations which can lead to such a violation.
"3 Id. at 343-44.
" 4 If the violation was by a shareholder, the relevant Code section would be 212.
See Nelson, supra note 88, at 354.
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tibility issue by other courts, the need for guidance in this area is
great. Too often in the past various rationales appear to have been
lumped together to justify a predetermined conclusion. 155 The inade-
quacies of employing the Arrowstnith -Skelly rationale as a primary basis
for determining the tax treatment of an insider's repayments have
been demonstrated.'" While the deductibility problem eludes easy
analysis, the public policy concerns and competing interests suggest an
appropriate premise from which to start. It is hoped that this concept,
in conjunction with a more careful examination of economic consider-
ations, will provide the flexibility necessary to achieve a balance of the
needs of both the tax system and the securities law.
JANET S. PAINTER
I" See text at notes 71.77 supra. See also Nelson, supra note 88, at 358-40.
'Sx See text at notes 71-92 supra.
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